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A Blurring of Roles: Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping
Maria do Céu Pinto Arena, Universidade do Minho
Abstract—There is a sober paradox involved in the use of oxymoron ‘peace operations’, as these operations, traditionally
anchored on the bedrock principles of UN peacekeeping - consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except
in self-defence -, are being increasingly transformed into enforcement operations. Twenty-seven years after the end of the
Cold War and the rebirth of the United Nations’ (UN) security role, peacekeeping operations are increasingly losing ground
to an emerging pattern of more aggressive, offensive operations. They have an essentially hybrid nature, involving elements
of both peacekeeping and enforcement. Although many see them as alternative, non-reconcilable techniques, politicians and
practitioners do not see a sharp dividing line separating non-coercive and enforcement tasks, permitting an easy transition
from one to the other.
Index Terms—UN peacekeeping operations (PKO), use of force, enforcement, consent, hybrid operations, asymmetric
environments.
F
1 From peace-keeping to peace-
enforcement
W ith the end of the Cold War, the UNbegan to authorise new peacekeeping mis-
sions explicitly under Chapter VII, providing a
prominent place to the use of force or other co-
ercive measures. Since the end of the Cold War,
the Security Council (UNSC) has declared more
instances for the use of force as legitimate, than
during the first four decades of its existence. Since
the 1990s, resolutions instituting new operations,
not only fall under Chapter VII, as they further
determine the existence of situations of ‘threats to
peace and international security 1. Since the turn
of the century, corresponding to the release of the
‘Brahimi Report’, UN resolutions invoke Chapter
VII, and detail specific situations where peace-
keepers are allowed to ‘use all necessary means’ to
carry out their mandate (Sloan, 2014: 692). Thus,
peacekeeping is no longer a non-offensive under-
taking: it has evolved into a proactive, offensive
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1. See UNSC Resolution 2304 of August 12 2016 on the UN
Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), authorizing an expanded
peacekeeping force to bolster civilian protection in its mandate.
activity (Sloan, 2014: 691). ‘Robust peacekeeping’
was defined as ‘a political and operational strat-
egy to signal the intention of a UN mission to
implement its mandate and to deter threats to
an existing peace process in the face of resistance
from spoilers’ (UN, 2009: 21)2.
As a rule, the use of force, authorized by the
UNSC, is intended to enhance the implementation
of the mandate of peacekeeping operations, or the
implementation of agreements between warring
parties. Initially, the use of force was only autho-
rized for self-defence purposes3, that is, defence of
the soldier by means of its weapons. The concept
of self-defence expanded, starting to include resis-
tance to attempts by force to prevent peacekeep-
ers from fulfilling their mandated duties (Sloan
2014: 684). After the establishment of UNEF II
in 1973, the self-defence rule was expanded to
accommodate the need for ‘defence of the mission’
(Hunt, 2016: 3).
However, experience has highlighted the need
2. Defined as ‘those who lie outside and seek to undermine the
peace process, including through violent means’ (Report, 2015:
para. 108).
3. The use of force in self-defence has limits to it, which is
codified in international law, and has been established through
practice. The most important are the criteria of necessity and
proportionality. Force may be used only if absolutely necessary,
and as a last resort. Secondly, the level of force deployed must
be proportionate to the threat.
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to further extend this understanding to allow
peacekeepers to use force in order to: (1) pro-
hibit attempts to disarm them, (2) defend their
positions, vehicles, and equipment against armed
attacks or attempts to capture them, and, (3) sup-
port other UN contingents (IPA, 1984: 57). This
concept was later broadened to allow UN peace-
keepers to protect civilian agencies and other UN
staff. Since 1999, the protection of civilians is
increasingly at the centre of the mission: ‘this in-
creased focus on humanitarian objectives reflects
a welcome shift in normative climate after the
Cold War, its central place in peacekeeping man-
dates. . . ’ (Berdal and Ucko, 2015: 11). Current
authorizations tend to specify that the physical
protection of civilians in UN peacekeeping be
limited to civilians ‘under imminent threat of
physical violence’, and only where such protection
can be accomplished by the mission ‘within its
capabilities’ and ‘within its areas of deployment’
(Sloan, 2014, 694)4. It also states that the ‘pro-
tection of civilians is the primary responsibility of
the host country’, which means that the UN’s role
is to ‘support the efforts of the host authorities
in protection of civilians from violence’ (UNSC
Resolution 2086, 2013: para. 8.h).
A latter trend was that the UNSC has autho-
rized member states or coalitions of states to use
force by delegation, and on its behalf. In fact,
Article 53 says that the UNSC may resort to
regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement
action, under its authority. Thus, if they engage
in ‘robust peacekeeping’ and ‘peace enforcement’
they are subject to UN Security Council approval
and oversight (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2006, p.
229). United Nations post-Cold War interven-
tions (Cambodia, Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
and Rwanda) occurred in volatile, high-risk, un-
4. S. Resolution 1769 of July 31 2007, on the joint African
Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID):
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the UNSC ‘decides
that UNAMID is authorized to take the necessary action, in
the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its
capabilities in order to: protect its personnel, facilities, instal-
lations and equipment, and to ensure the security and freedom
of movement of its own personnel and humanitarian workers;
support early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace
Agreement, prevent the disruption of its implementation and
armed attacks, and protect civilians, without prejudice to the
responsibility of the Government of Sudan’ (UNSC Resolution
1769, 2007, para. 15).
certain environments, and in civil wars with mul-
tiform contours. As Mackinlay and Chopra point
out, in these operations it is essential that the
contours of the use of force be defined without
ambiguity. It is necessary ‘... that clear politi-
cal decisions precede and sustain a mandate ...
but in the execution of tasks, the importance of
military effectiveness grows as the intensity of
the operation increases, until, at the threshold of
collective enforcement, it becomes the main key
to success’ (Mackinlay and Chopra, 1993). These
operations have been referred to in traditional
slang as ‘middle ground’ or ‘grey area operations’,
as they are halfway between traditional peace-
keeping and peace-enforcement. Brian Urquhart,
one of the architects of UN peacekeeping, has
admitted the need for an intermediate option
between the peacekeeping/peace-enforcement bi-
nary: ‘a third category of international military
operation is needed, somewhere between peace-
keeping and large-scale enforcement. It would be
intended to put an end to random violence, and
to provide a reasonable degree of peace and or-
der so that humanitarian relief work could go
forward and a conciliation process could com-
mence. The forces involved would be relatively
small, representatively international, and would
not have military objectives as such. But, un-
like [traditional] peacekeeping forces, such troops
would be required to take, initially at least, certain
combat risks in bringing violence under control.
They would essentially be armed police actions’
(Urquhart, 1991: 9). The peace operations of
the 1990s glaringly displayed the shortcomings
of traditional peacekeeping principles, in opera-
tions characterized by limited consent: they were
labelled ‘complex operations’ because they may
require the partial use of force to ensure the
execution of the mandate. The case of the UN op-
eration in Somalia clearly shows how local forces
may not agree with the UN presence or with a
peace plan, even because the various rebel factions
may not be under the control of any of the main
parties to the conflict, may lack a formal internal
structure and coherent leadership, and, thus be
viable interlocutors. In these cases, the UN has no
line of communication with the ‘spoilers’ (should
they be identifiable at all!), or there is a common
understanding of a peace agreement and of the
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mandate of the blue helmets. In cases of anarchy,
the UN may abandon any pretence of consent,
and establish a presence in the country through
an enforcement action under Chapter VII, as
happened with the American mission in Somalia
in December 1992 (UNITAF, Unified Task Force
on Somalia). More recently, the United Nations
Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) refused to
comply with President Laurent Gbagbo’s request
to leave the country, eventually being dragged into
a military showdown against Gbagbo’s forces, in-
cluding targeting the presidential residence (Pic-
colino and Karlsrud, 2011: 458). The UN Mis-
sion to Chad and the Central African Republic,
MINURCAT, was requested to pull out of Chad
by the end of 2010, barely after less than three
years on the ground. Only reluctantly did the gov-
ernment accept the mission, and then succeeded
in terminating it in an expedite manner, after
undermining its role and rendering it unable to
comply with its major engagement - supporting
the protection of civilians within a larger peace-
building agenda (Piccolino and Karlsrud, 2011:
459-461). The ‘withering consent’ poses a ‘difficult
dilemma to the UN, balancing between keeping
peacekeeping missions on the ground with limited
or no consent, or leaving and risking breaking
its implicit engagements with the civilian popu-
lation.’ (Piccolino and Karlsrud, 2011: 447).
Coming back to the use of force in ‘defence
of the mission’ this is an area is which there is
a [middle] muddle ground )5, because it has gen-
erated confusion and uncertainty as regards the
right sense of interpretation, especially in terms
of force commanders. As is widely known, the
UNSC tends to draft the mandate of its missions
in the broadest possible terms, and to be the
least concrete possible regarding crucial details,
potentially compromising the proper functioning
of the mission: as, what to do if the mission
cannot perform tasks that have been committed
to it; what if the parties do not cooperate or
deliberately offer resistance. Mandates are often
5. It is a homophonic pun. It alludes to the fact that ‘the mid-
dle ground in contemporary UN peacekeeping is so confusing
that it may be more aptly described as the "(middle)muddle
ground", not least because UN forces deployed in such opera-
tions are perceived to be muddling through in the execution of
a variety of incoherent mandates, without the reassurance of a
clear-cut doctrinal foundation for operations’ (Malan, 1996: 2).
too general, to be able to anticipate and resolve
the practical challenges missions face in assisting
peace and security tasks.
Given the usual aloofness of the UNSC, the
responsibility to interpret the sense of "defence
of the mission" is devolved upon the Secretary-
General/Secretariat. The interpretation of what
is the ‘defence of the mission’ obviously depends
on the nature and context of the mission. If it
is essentially a humanitarian mission, then the
use of force can be allowed so that peacekeepers
have free access to critical areas. If the mission
requires disarming and demobilizing combatants,
using force may be more problematic, since it can
trigger a spiral of confrontation. In this regard,
it is important to note the Security Council’s
Resolution 1674 of 2006 on the protection of
civilians in armed conflicts, a landmark docu-
ment on a particular thematic area of concern
to peace operations. It says that attacks against
civilians and ‘the deliberate targeting of civilians
and other protected persons, and the commis-
sion of systematic, flagrant and widespread vio-
lations of international humanitarian and human
rights law in situations of armed conflict, may
constitute a threat to international peace and
security’ (para. 26). The Resolution reaffirms in
this regard ‘its readiness to consider such situa-
tions and, where necessary, to adopt appropriate
steps...’ (para. 26). The Resolution also specifies
that: 1. mandates of UN peacekeeping, political
and peacebuilding missions include clear guide-
lines as to what missions can and should do to
protect civilians; 2. the use of available capacity
and resources must be prioritized to enable the
protection of civilians, and 3. protection mandates
must be effectively implemented (para. 16). The
Report on the Rwanda genocide also blamed the
UNSC for lack of political will to increase the
intervention force in Rwanda in order to stop the
massacres. In face of the genocide, the Report
concludes that the UN has ‘an obligation to act
which transcended traditional principles of peace-
keeping’ (Report, 1999: 50).
The doctrine of ‘muscular peacekeeping’ has
been gaining acceptance within the UN Secre-
tariat. That is what some authors have labelled
a ‘robust turn’ (Hunt, 2017: 110 and ff.). The ex-
perience of peacekeeping operations in the 1990s
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has helped overcome the taboo on the use of
force (Annan, 1993)6. However, the use of force
within the framework of peacekeeping missions
is a controversial matter, and the on-going dis-
cussions on this subject are not clarifying. When
in 1992, Boutros-Ghali, in the Agenda for Peace,
advocated the use of ‘enforcement-units’, that is,
peacekeeping forces mandated to use force, he
strongly challenged the organization to use such
forces in special circumstances only, such as failure
to make belligerents comply with cease-fire agree-
ments.
For those cases, he recommended ‘that
the Council consider the utilization of peace-
enforcement units in clearly defined circumstances
and with their terms of reference specified in
advance. Such units from Member States would
be available on call and would consist of troops
that have volunteered for such service. They
would have to be more heavily armed than peace-
keeping forces and would need to undergo ex-
tensive preparatory training within their national
forces’ (UN, 1992: para. 44). This is a type of
intervention which, as the Secretary-General (SG)
acknowledged, ‘... on occasion exceed the mission
of peace-keeping forces and the expectations of
peace-keeping force contributors’ (UN, 1992: para.
44). According to Boutros-Ghali, it would be up
to the SC to decide, when and in what terms
to exceed the limits of traditional peacekeeping.
However, this bold proposition left a series of
crucial questions unanswered: to what extent may
these tasks exceed the boundaries of peacekeep-
ing, stricto sensu? Which are the consequences, as
far as peacekeeping philosophy, of the incorpora-
tion of coercive principles in operations that are
peaceful, neutral, and impartial? That assump-
tion rested on the premise that peace-enforcement
was a more advanced stage of peacekeeping, and
not a deviation or outright contradiction to it.
Authors such as Adam Roberts challenge the in-
terpretation that views peace-enforcement as an
extension of peacekeeping: ‘It must be doubtful
whether it is right to hi-jack the respected term
“peacekeeping” and apply it to actions which are
6. In 1993, Annan stated: ‘the principles and practices which
had evolved in the Cold War period suddenly seemed needlessly
self-limiting.Within and outside the UN, there is now increasing
support for peacekeeping with teeth’ (Annan, 1993).
not based on the full consent of all the parties,
and which involve extensive use of force’ (Roberts,
1994: 110).
In the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace,
and following the Somalia disaster, Boutros-Ghali
abandoned the concept of peace-enforcement
units to return to the traditional terms of peace-
keeping, and of enforcement in its narrower under-
standing. In 1995, the UNSG stated that peace-
keeping operations require the consent of the bel-
ligerents, and that the use of force is not within
the nature of peacekeeping: it ‘is necessary to
resist the temptation to use military power’, he
said, even when it could ‘speed up the resolution
of the conflict’ (UN, 1995, para. 36). The rationale
for that new understanding was that ‘the logic
of peace-keeping flows from political and mili-
tary premises that are quite distinct from those
of enforcement; and the dynamics of the latter
are incompatible with the political process that
peace-keeping is intended to facilitate. To blur
the distinction between the two can undermine
the viability of peacekeeping operations and en-
danger its personnel’ (UN, 1995, para. 35). The
proposal of ‘muscular peacekeeping’ (peace en-
forcement units), like other proposals contained
in the Agenda for Peace, had an exploratory
nature, in an attempt to articulate new paths
to strengthening and making more efficient the
United Nations capacity for preventive diplomacy,
peace-making, and peace-keeping. They were trial
balloons, of an ambitious and active SG that
seized on the historic opportunity opened up by
the end of the Cold War, as well as the availability
of the permanent members of the UNSC, who, in
January 31 1992, in a UNSC meeting of Heads of
State and Government, encouraged the UNSG to
provide recommendations to make of the UN an
effective organization in resolving conflicts. How-
ever, all these initiatives were ultimately bound
to be accepted by the UNSC permanent mem-
bers. In 1995, the atmosphere of enthusiasm that
had marked the launch of the Agenda for Peace
had been fatally marred by the United Nations
Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) disaster
in the streets of Mogadishu. The UN stressed,
however, that peacekeeping forces should not be
mixed up or confused with peace-enforcement
forces; that peacekeeping operations should not
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be of a coercive nature (Jakobsen, 2000, p. 46).
Enforcement is presented as an activity that by its
very nature requires separate and distinct forces
from peacekeeping.
In UN Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons
Learned from the Former Yugoslavia, Wolfgang
Biermann and Martin Vadset bring together the
contributions of some of the key players in re-
solving the war in the former Yugoslavia. Among
them are the United Nations Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) commanders Gen. Bertrand de
Lapresle and Gen. Michael Rose. The conclu-
sions of these protagonists are remarkable by the
consensus that they express on the reluctance
to using force within the scope of peacekeeping.
They underline, on the one hand, the natural
incompatibility between peacekeeping and peace-
enforcement. While on the other hand, they assert
that ‘... classic peacekeeping principles of consent,
impartiality, and use of force in self-defence. . .
remained fundamental to the success of peace-
keeping operations in civil war-type situations
such as that in FY’ (Biermann and Vadset, 1998:
57). Gen. Michael Rose says it is crucial that "war-
fighting goals are never pursued by peacekeeping
forces (Rose, 1998: 158)7.
The use of force in Yugoslavia was assessed
in an extremely negative manner by those pro-
tagonists. First of all, because, from the outset,
UN forces had not been prepared, trained, and
equipped for a coercive operation. Secondly, be-
cause the decision to use force was an improvised
reaction to circumstances, and therefore lacked
the means for military planning and a fair political
evaluation of its appropriateness as an instru-
ment for peacekeeping. Thirdly, because the use
of force was often a response to pressure from
international public opinion. Fourth, because the
international community was deeply divided over
the usefulness and relevance of using force. In
general, the mandate to use force plunged UN-
PROFOR into a "vicious circle: more enforcement
- less support - more chaos in UN operations’
(Biermann and Vadset, 1998, p. 25).
In the Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali min-
imized the issue of consent by defining peace-
keeping as a ‘United Nations presence on the
7. Author’s italics.
ground, hitherto with the consent of the parties
concerned ...’ (UN, 1992: para. 20). Some commen-
tators interpreted this bold stance of the SG as
a reconceptualization of peacekeeping that raised
serious concerns, and an increasing willingness to
take risks. Some experts, such as Thomas Weiss,
expressed discomfort and concern about the lack
of practicality of those proposals (Weiss, 1995:
176). The use of the expression ‘hitherto’ was
intentional, since the launching of the United Na-
tions Mission Preventive Deployment Force (UN-
PREDEP) to Macedonia was done without the
consent of the Serbs.
Perhaps, as a consequence of the operations in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia, Boutros-Ghali
restored the UN original, non-coercive formula-
tion. In 1995, in his Supplement to the Agenda
for Peace - although showing great circumspec-
tion in the choice of words -, he seemed to
abandon the idea of peacekeeping action where
the consent of the belligerents was not assured
and where force might be employed. The UNSG
stated that successful peacekeeping was one where
PKO ‘principles’ were respected and ‘in most
of the less successful operations one or other
of them was not’ (Supplement, 1995, para. 33).
Boutros-Ghali thus returned to the traditional
dichotomy peacekeeping/enforcement operations.
As Biermann and Vadset would say, this attitude
‘... can be interpreted as a return to principles,
less ambitious and more realistic UN operations’.
This cautious attitude did not prevent the UN
from engaging in difficult-to-frame contexts where
peacekeeping came to be combined with peace-
enforcement and the absence of consent.
The use of force in peacekeeping missions is a
controversial matter and the on-going debates on
this matter are not even enlightening. Sir Gen.
Michael Rose, former commander of UNPRO-
FOR, coined the phrase ‘Mogadishu line’ – which
later became popular in discussions in this area
– to convey the idea of the risks undertaken by
crossing the border that separates peacekeeping
from peace-enforcement. Gen. Rose says that the
level of force that exceeds the requirements of
peacekeeping is like ‘...crossing the border - the
line of Mogadishu - that separates combatants
from non-combatants’ (Rose, 1998: 159). Gen.
Rose states that it is obvious that when a military
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force is in the service of a humanitarian peace-
keeping mission, it is forbidden, by its very nature
and rules of engagement, to act as a combatant
(Rose, 1998: 157). The UNPROFOR commander
says that his experience is a demonstration that
military action in the context of peace operations
jeopardizes the lives of blue helmets, and under-
mines the humanitarian part of the mission (Rose,
1998: 159). Gen. Rose gives the example of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, where aid to Muslims living in
the enclaves was conducted through territories
controlled by Serbs. The Bosnian Serbs had a
policy of preventing the creation of deposits of
essential goods in order to maintain a constant
pressure on the populations. At the end of the day,
it were these communities that paid the highest
price when NATO or UNPROFOR used force to
counter attacks or provocations: they were the
most directly affected since they were dependent
on UN humanitarian aid. Gen. Rose also says
that the use of force in Bosnia-Herzegovina put
at risk blue helmets scattered on the ground
and in numerical inferiority. The Serbs were well
aware of the reduced military capacity of UN
forces, and of the vulnerabilities of peacekeepers,
which penalized the latter. In April 1994, after
a series of NATO bombings caused by the Serb
attacks on Goradze, they took 155 blue helmets
as hostages (Rose, 1998: 159). However, Rose
himself acknowledges that if the peace mission
involves tasks, such as ‘deliver aid, maintain the
regime of a total exclusion zone or deter attacks
against Safe Areas then it will have to adopt a
very forceful approach to peacekeeping indeed. To
be credible, a peacekeeping mission must be in
a position to escalate, moving if necessary beyond
the traditional Chapter VI peacekeeping to peace-
enforcement’ (Rose, 1998: 157). He further says
that ‘a commander on the ground must neverthe-
less be given the discretion to use force as and
when he sees fit... It is therefore essential that
the Rules of Engagement under which he operates
must be flexible enough to give him leeway to act.
Thus, if, when the mission is first deployed there
exists the possibility that force will be required,
then the mandate, and resources, will have to
clearly reflect this’ (Rose, 1998: 158). Eventually,
he takes the view that ‘... the need to maintain
consent and impartiality on one hand, and the
need to use force on the other, must be reconciled
in the minds of the international community if
peacekeeping is going to continue to be a viable
option of international conflict resolution’ (Rose,
1998: 157).
In the report on the Srebrenica tragedy of July
1995, Kofi Annan made an eloquent call for a more
robust response to future humanitarian tragedies.
He stated: ‘The cardinal lesson of Srebrenica is
that a deliberate and systematic attempt to ter-
rorise, expel or murder an entire people must be
met decisively with all necessary means, and with
the political will to carry the policy through to
its logical conclusion’ (UNGA, 1999: para. 501).
In Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, it would have
been necessary to use force to put an end to
organized campaigns to eliminate and expel the
population. The blue helmets in Srebrenica (the
Dutch battalion Dutchbat-3 ) numbered around
600 personnel. About half had only light arma-
ment and acted under the peacekeeping rules of
engagement. They did not have tanks, and the
approach towards the Serbs was only to fire warn-
ing shots. The 2000 Serbian forces, on the other
hand, were equipped with armour and artillery. At
the beginning of the offensive against the so-called
‘protected areas’, the Dutch commander asked
for NATO’s air support against the approach-
ing Bosnian-Serb army led by General Ratko
Mládic. His request was rejected by the Secretary-
General’s Special Representative Yasushi Akashi,
and by the military commander of the UN forces
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Gen. Bernard Janvier.
On July 11, Janvier and Akashi approved the
attack, but limited to the use of battle tanks
and Serbian artillery - conditions that made it
difficult for NATO pilots to act. On learning of
this decision, the Dutch defence minister called
for the suspension of the attacks, claiming that
the Dutch blue helmets could be hit, given their
proximity to the Serbs on the ground.
In these conditions, the Dutch troops were
vastly outgunned and outnumbered, and had no
choice but to give in without resistance: some
surrendered, others were captured or withdrawn
from their posts. The Dutch helped the Serbs
evacuate the population of the city, including
sorting the population, that is, separating men
(aged between approximately 16 and 65) from
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women, children, and elderly. More than 8,000
Bosnian Muslims were subsequently killed. The
report concludes that the use of air strikes in
support of blue helmets was ‘clearly warranted’,
since Serbian artillery attacks had begun five days
earlier (UNGA, 1999: para. 480).
2 Doctrinal Developments in the Af-
termath of the Brahimi Report
Kofi Annan, the new Secretary General after the
1990s Rwanda and Srebrenica tragedies, took a
more open position on the role of the UN in peace
operations. In March 2000, Annan convened the
‘Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Opera-
tions’, led by Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi.
In the history of the UN, the Brahimi Report
is the work that presents the most profound re-
flection on the issue of peacekeeping, advancing
with new critical concepts. The conclusions of the
Brahimi Report are the outcome of the evolution
of peacekeeping in the 1990s, particularly rapid
and fruitful in terms of new developments and
lessons learned. The report also stems from An-
nan’s personal experience in the management of
post-Cold War peace operations. Annan publicly
acknowledged the flaws that undermined the or-
ganization’s credibility, in particular the Secre-
tariat’s remissness regarding the building up of
the Rwandan conflict. SG Annan said that the
UN needed to develop a ‘new paradigm’ for peace
operations, in particular to focus on ‘inducing con-
sent’ measures. He also advocated the need for the
UN to equip itself with the skills to swiftly deploy
personnel into peacekeeping scenarios, properly
resourced and equipped, as well as the means of
intelligence gathering (Annan, 1998: 172). Annan
questioned the sacred principle of consent of the
parties, saying that in the context of states in
anarchy, this requirement could be ‘neither right
nor wrong’, but ‘quite simply, irrelevant’ (Annan,
1998: 172). Ultimately, consent is dependent on
the will of the parties. It is not a decision that the
parties to a conflict take in abstract, but depends
on the alternatives at hand and the calculation
of opportunity: ‘If consent carries with it certain
rewards and the failure to consent carries certain
costs, this obviously affects the decision as to
whether or not consent will be granted’ (Annan,
1998: 172-3). Thus, a mission must be prepared
to offer a panoply of costs and rewards. Annan
used the term ‘induced consent’ and ‘coercive
consent’, the first consisting of rewards to gain the
goodwill of the population and of the erstwhile
antagonists to further the reconciliation process,
and the second intimidating the recalcitrant and
warlords into ‘acquiescence’ (Annan, 1998: 174-
5). The purpose of induction operations is to: ‘...
restore civil society where it has broken down by
two methods: (1) the use of positive incentives
(rewards) to induce, in the first instance, consent
and cooperation with the peace operations, and,
beyond that, reconciliation, and, (2) the threat
of coercion to gain the consent and cooperation,
however grudging, of those who are unrespon-
sive to positive incentives’ (Annan, 1998: 173).
According to Annan, it is essential to obtain,
from the outset, and then continuously cultivate,
the acquiescence of the majority of the popula-
tion to the UN presence. A UN mission should
try to create positive incentives for ‘winning the
hearts and minds’ of the population. In any case,
the use of coercion/force, albeit in fundamental
contradiction with the spirit of peacekeeping, is
subordinated to a higher-level logic. It always has
a constructive purpose: to persuade spoilers to
cooperate in a plan for the reconstruction and
pacification of a society. The ‘Lessons Learned
Unit’, of the Department of Peacekeeping Oper-
ations, has come to accept the concept of acting
as a well-armed and effective force. The Brahimi
Report maintains the term peacekeeping, but uses
the terms ‘complex’ or ‘robust’ operations to refer,
euphemistically, to peace enforcement (Report of
the Panel, 2000: viii, xi). The Report thus calls
into question some of the assumptions of classi-
cal peacekeeping. The Report is an apologist of
‘muscled forces’, ‘... in contrast to the symbolic
and non-threatening presence that characterizes
traditional peacekeeping’ (Report of the Panel,
2000, para. 51). The Brahimi Report is quite
peremptory when it argues that once deployed,
UN military units should be able to defend them-
selves, the various components of the mission,
and the mandate. Rules of engagement should
be ‘robust’, against those who renege on their
commitments to a peace accord or that otherwise
seek to undermine it by violence, ‘to cede the
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initiative to their attackers’ (Brahimi, para. 49).
Mandates should also specify the authority of the
operation to use force. UN forces should be larger
and better equipped to have a credible deterrent
potential, which obviously contrasts with the non-
threatening posture that characterizes traditional
peacekeeping. In line with the logic laid out above,
‘defence of the mandate’ has been implemented
mainly in the sense of protecting civilians, but
also extends ‘to assuming a deterrent posture to
proactively dissuade ‘spoilers’, ensure the freedom
of movement of peacekeepers, and other terms of
the Status of Forces Agreement’ (Hunt, 2016: 4).
The 2004 Report produced by the High-level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A
More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,
also deals with the issue of the use of force by
the UN. It frames it as a response to threats
foreseen under Chapter VII8. The Report says
that it became the current practice of the UNSC
to provide peacekeeping missions with a mandate
under Chapter VII.
The document justifies this ‘...on the basis
that even the most benign environment can turn
sour - when spoilers emerge to undermine a peace
agreement and put civilians at risk - and that
it is desirable for there to be complete certainty
about the mission’s capacity to respond with
force, if necessary’ (UN, 2004: para. 213). The
Report is contradictory on this issue: it recom-
mends robust missions if they are to face hostile
opposition, but admits those contexts ‘are not ap-
propriate for consent-based peacekeeping; rather,
they must be met with concerted action’ (UN,
2004: para. 222). In peacebuilding missions, where
post-conflict peace-building tasks are often under-
mined by spoilers and by the different factions
in conflict, ‘contingency plans for responding to
hostile opposition should be an integral part of
the mission design; missions that do not have the
troop strength to resist aggression will invite it’
8. Regarding the use of force under Chapter VII in response
to ‘any threat to peace, breach of peace or act of aggression’,
the report distinguishes between external threats (actual or
potential, to other States or people outside its borders), and
internal threats (to a State’s own people), and the consequent
responsibility of States to protect their populations. In all
cases, in order to be legitimate, the use of force must meet
the following criteria: seriousness of threat; proper purpose; last
resort; proportional means, and balance of consequences (UN,
2004: para. 56).
(UN, 2004: para. 222). The UN’s 2008 capstone
doctrine on peacekeeping was an attempt to cod-
ify the basic principles and concepts underpinning
the conduct of contemporary United Nations in
light of the major lessons of United Nations peace-
keeping experience (UNDPKO, 2008). It argues
that ‘while robust peacekeeping involves the use
of force at the tactical level, with the consent of
the host authorities and/or the main parties to
the conflict, peace enforcement may involve the
use of force at the strategic level’ – although the
report acknowledges that this line ‘may appear
blurred’ (UNDPKO, 2008: 19). The document
distinguishes the two instances, underlining that
there are important differences. Robust peace-
keeping involves the use of force at the tactical
level, meaning with the consent of the host au-
thorities and/or the main parties to the conflict.
Peace enforcement involves the use of force at the
strategic or international level, which is normally
prohibited for member States, unless authorized
by the Security Council (UNDPKO, 2008: 19).9
The High-Level Independent Panel on Peace
Operations (HIPPO) convened in 2014 by Ban ki-
Moon conducted a comprehensive assessment of
the state of UN peace operations, and the emerg-
ing trends regarding the future. The Panel cau-
tioned against the tendency to resort to enforce-
ment tasks in the gambit of a UN peacekeeping
operation. It specified a number of important pre-
requisites to be taken into consideration in avail-
ing such a possibility: 1. ‘any such mandate task
should be a time-limited, exceptional measure’; 2.
it should be ‘conducted in support of a clear and
achievable political end state’, and 3. ‘in full re-
spect of international humanitarian law’ (UNGA
and UNSC, 2015: para. 119). As stated in previous
documents, the Report underlines such operations
may make the UN forces, and the mission as a
whole, a party to the conflict. It also points to
the negative downside for the humanitarian, and
other consequences that invariably flow from the
sustained use of force. The Panel supports the
9. Similarly, in 2012 the UNSG’s report on peacekeeping
reform argued that contrary to enforcement activity, ‘respect
for the basic principles of peacekeeping, such as the consent
of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except in
self-defence and in the defence of a mandate authorized by the
Security Council’ (GA, 2012: 25).
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view of humanitarian interlocutors on the need to
maintain a clear distinction between peacekeep-
ing operations with enforcement mandates, and
humanitarian actors and objectives.
3 Emerging Trends
The challenge posed by the question is increas-
ingly relevant, bearing in mind that the UN has
been increasingly called upon to intervene and
mediate conflicts. It is engaged in 39 missions
across the globe, with 128,000 civilian and uni-
formed personnel. In the context of these de-
mands, the UN is required to juggle several
shortcomings in responding to new emergencies:
dwindling resources, the diminishing willingness
of member states to contribute, and ever more
insecure environments and intractable conflicts.
In the first two decades of this century we have
noticed a number of trends regarding peace op-
erations with an enforcement bend. One of the
most significant is the attitude of the developed,
Western contributors. Regarding the use of force,
states have actually shown a dual attitude. On
the one hand, they insist that the mandate of
UN operations should provide for the use of
force in self-defence, so as to enable troops to
defend themselves. On the other hand, they are
reluctant to allow peacekeeping operations to use
that capacity and engage in enforcement activities
(Tardy, 2007: 60). The reluctance to authorize
enforcement missions lies in the fact that, because
of their more forceful nature and the potential for
confronting ‘spoilers’, there is greater likelihood
of there being casualties. Attacks on UN troops
and police have negatively affected the willingness
of troop contributing countries to deploy to UN
missions (Karlsrud, 2015: 49). Furthermore, in
the case of more important states, the fear is
that the organization may usurp their monopoly
on the use of force. In all cases, and, especially
since the failures of peace operations in the 1990s,
there is a diminishing political will for robust
intervention by member states and UNSC mem-
bers. The most powerful UN states have shifted
their resources away from UN operations, which
has created resource constraints that hamstrung
current UN peacekeeping missions. Western states
have contributed personnel to so-called ‘hybrid
missions’, that is, missions that work in step
with UN forces or troops from other interna-
tional organizations. That was the case of Balkan
operations, such as the NATO-led Stabilisation
Force (SFOR) in Bosnia (1996), and the Kosovo
Force (KFOR), which supported the UN Mission
in Kosovo (UNMIK). In those cases, the Western
troop contribution lies outside the command and
control structures of the United Nations (Bellamy
and Williams, 2009: 44). A parallel and related
trend is the role played by the UN’s more powerful
member states assisting UN operations facing a
threat to the mandate or a sudden deterioration
in the security environment. This is what Bel-
lamy and Williams have called ‘fire-fighting’ op-
erations: deployments to conduct limited enforce-
ment activities alongside on-going UN operations
(Bellamy, 2009: 48). Western ‘fire-fighting’ oper-
ations include the British military engagement in
Sierra Leone in 2000, the French-led Operation
Turquoise in support of UNAMIR in Rwanda
(1994), the 2003 French-led Interim Emergency
Multinational Force (IEMF – Artemis) in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and
the 2013 French Operation Serval, in which spe-
cial forces targeted armed groups in Northern
Mali (Perito, 2015: 8-9; Karlsrud, 2015: 47). In
recent years, many sub-Saharan conflict zones in
particular have witnessed the swift deployment of
Western quick-reaction forces within the context
of broader UN operations. In those cases, contri-
butions ‘tend to be relatively small (consisting,
at most, of a few thousand soldiers), deployed for
only a short period of time and confined to lim-
ited geographical areas’ (Bellamy and Williams,
2009: 50). This option is more palatable to West-
ern powers, which privilege shorter-term engage-
ments, rather than the drawn-out and costly de-
ployments, such as the one in Afghanistan. A
second trend, a doctrinal change in UN peace-
keeping, is that the use of force is linked to
stabilization operations. As has been mentioned
above, civilian protection has become a hallmark
of the new generation of missions, but it is the
stabilization logic that underlies the application
of force. What stabilization operations have in
common is, that they operate in the midst of on-
going conflicts, and, they work to bolster the au-
thority of civil authorities. Their mandates tasks
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them to contribute to support the government
and to build the host nations’ capacity to bolster
state authority, which, actually means restoring
and maintaining order in a given situation against
the moves of identified aggressors. Thus, they
are tasked to undertake robust operations against
specific spoilers (Hunt, 2017: 112). Contrary to
the original spirit of peacekeeping, the focus of
which is on conflict resolution; in stabilization the
objective is limited to conflict management or con-
tainment (de Coning, 2015). The focus on tack-
ling spoilers, which inhibit the extension of state
authority, informed the reconfigurement of the
mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo - MONUSCO)
and, more recently, authorized operations in Mali
(MINUSMA), and in the Central African Repub-
lic (UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation
Mission in the Central African Republic - MI-
NUSCA) (Hunt: 112). An example of these new,
targeted, offensive operations was the launching
in March 2013 of the Intervention Brigade (UN
Force Intervention Brigade - FIB), within the
existing MONUSCO. The brigade was announced
as the first-ever United Nations ‘offensive’ combat
force intended to neutralize and disarm the rebel
groups (Hunt, 2017: 112-113; Karlsrud, 2015: 45).
Opponents complained that the FIB endangered
other UN military forces in the DRC that oper-
ated under a traditional peacekeeping mandate,
and which were not prepared for combat. Critics
argued that the FIB made the United Nations
a party to the conflict, violating the core peace-
keeping principles of impartiality and non-use of
force. It undermined the legal protection afforded
by peacekeepers based on their neutrality. The
UN acted in a clearly partial way, by siding with
one of the armed groups (albeit the armed forces
of an elected government), and by identifying
other groups - primarily the rebel military group
M23/Congolese Revolutionary Army -, as spoil-
ers to be ‘neutralized’ militarily. Humanitarian
groups voiced concerns that the FIB’s combat-
ant status would turn civilian and humanitar-
ian components of the UN into potential targets
(Karlsrud, 2015: 45). Another issue that is worth
considering in the present context, is the fact that
UN operations – as highlighted in the HIPPO
Report – are required to operate in environments
where there are violent extremist forces and ter-
rorist groups, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb, and Ansar al-Dine in Mali. Seven mis-
sions currently deployed (IPI, 2016: 2) operate
in countries where al-Qaeda and Daesh (the so-
called Islamic State) are an incumbent threat to
the missions. Interventions in asymmetric envi-
ronments were foreshadowed by the UN Assis-
tance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), along-
side the NATO-led security mission, International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) (Perito 2015: 7).
This points to the need to equip soldiers with more
sophisticated means, such as using a combination
of human and signal intelligence sources such as
drones, and including Special Forces to support
more conventional forces (Karlsrud, 2015: 49).
More war-prone UN operations are a result of the
counterinsurgency lessons drawn from U.S. and
coalition efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.
4 Conclusion
The move towards peace enforcement has been
conformed as a trend in UN peace operations ever
since the end of the Cold War, and, especially,
in the new century. UN PKO have proven to be
a flexible and adaptable tool that has evolved
over time to respond to evolving challenges. The
understanding of the use of force has evolved over
time, as well as its degree and level. At times,
peacekeeping and peace-enforcement were seen as
adjacent points on a continuum, and not as alter-
native techniques. At present, offensive operations
are on the verge of raising the use of force to
a strategic/operational level, instead of the more
unbiased tactical level to defend the mission and
manage spoilers. A more robust posture is the
response to the new unstable security environ-
ment, punctuated by irregular actors and asym-
metric threats. Currently, the UN is deployed to a
range of environments where it conducts military
counterterrorism operations, as in Afghanistan,
Iraq, Libya, Mali, and Somalia. There remains the
larger challenge of the ultimate purpose of the use
of force, that is, the appropriate level which serves
the mission’s purposes, without undermining the
UN’s peacekeeping reputation as a neutral arbiter.
There is a predicament of peacekeeping soldiers:
PERSPECTIVAS, JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, SPECIAL ISSUE 2017 61
to use force, or the failure to use force when
action is required, which impact the confidence
of the local civilian population and the interna-
tional community. The dilemma is finding the
right balance in applying force, without crippling
the constitutive principles of the institution of
peacekeeping in general.
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